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[Cross-examination is] the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth.'
The right of confrontation is worth the cost. It is, after all, not a
"technicality" serving some extraneous purpose .... It bears directly on
and significantly advances the truth-seeking function of sentencing
hearings.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Darrell Beaulieu and his two brothers were charged with conspiracy to
manufacture drugs.3 Beaulieu pled guilty, but his brothers took the case to trial.
During the brothers' trial, multiple witnesses described the conspiracy and identified
Beaulieu as the leader. Following his brothers' trial, Beaulieu was sentenced under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or "Guidelines"). Based on
testimony from the brothers' trial, the district court increased Beaulieu's sentence
under USSG section 3B1.1(a) for being an "organizer or leader" of a criminal
activity.
Beaulieu argued on appeal that the district court should not have relied on this
testimony without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
identified him as the leader of the conspiracy, as required by the Sixth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that "the constitutional requirements mandated
in a criminal trial as to confrontation and cross-examination do not apply at non-
capital sentencing proceedings."4
United States v. Beaulieu illustrates the rule that has become the law in virtually
every circuit in the country: the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing.5
Recently, however, two Supreme Court cases have prompted courts to reconsider
this rule. In Crawford v. Washington,6 the Supreme Court fundamentally changed its
Confrontation Clause analysis, adopting an approach that gives the clause much
greater meaning at sentencing. In United States v. Booker,7 the motivation for this
symposium, the Court held that the mandatory application of the Guidelines requires
Sixth Amendment protections, which presumably includes confrontation rights.
1. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974).
2. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 412 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
3. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 1180 (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d
1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1993), amended on other grounds, 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Badger,
983 F.2d 1443, 1459 (7th Cir. 1993); Wise, 976 F.2d at 393 (en banc), rev'g United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d
100 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (lst Cir. 1992); United States v. Silverman,
976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (1992) (en banc), rev'g 945 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d
47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990); Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180.
6. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Nevertheless, every court to consider whether the Confrontation Clause
applies at sentencing in light of these two cases has rejected the possibility,
relying uncritically on their pre-Booker Confrontation Clause cases.8 But this
precedent is misguided and should not be followed for several reasons. First, it
ignores the text of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a right to confront
adverse witnesses, not just at trial, but in all criminal prosecutions. Second, it
relies on the premise that the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) did not
fundamentally change federal sentencing so as to require Sixth Amendment
protections, a premise that Booker squarely rejects. Third, it is based on an
understanding of the Confrontation Clause that Crawford has rejected. Finally, it
is based on now-rejected sentencing policy.
In light of these defects, federal courts should reconsider their precedent,
hold that the Confrontation Clause applies at post-Booker sentencing under the
SRA, and give defendants the benefits of Crawford at sentencing. In reaching
that conclusion, this article first lays out a brief chronology of federal sentencing
law and policy, showing how federal courts came to deny confrontation rights at
sentencing. Part II demonstrates why this precedent should not be followed. Part
III explains why the Confrontation Clause ought to apply at sentencing as a
matter of constitutional interpretation and as a consequence of the SRA. Part IV
discusses how Crawford might reasonably be applied at sentencing and the
practical implications of such protection.
II. THE CHRONOLOGY OF SENTENCING
In order to understand how defendants' confrontation rights are implicated at
sentencing, it is necessary to understand how sentencing has evolved over the
years. Federal sentencing law and policy in this country can be grouped into three
main eras. First is the era of indeterminate sentencing, which was motivated
largely by a rehabilitative ideal and prevailed from the beginning of this country
through 1987. Second is the era of mandatory guideline sentencing, characterized
by a determinate sentencing scheme that limited judicial discretion at sentencing
from 1987 through 2005. Finally is the post-Booker era of sentencing that has
prompted this symposium, which I will call the era of guided sentencing.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d
239 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rigdon, 2005 WL 1664454 (5th Cir. July 18, 2005); United States v. Stone,
432 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown,
430 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGuffin, 2005 WL 1526109 (10th Cir. June 29, 2005); United
States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (1 1th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. W. Va.
2005).
2006 / Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing
A. Indeterminate Sentencing and the Rehabilitative Ideal
At the time of this country's founding, criminal justice was undergoing a
transformation from a determinate sentencing model to an indeterminate model.
In the years preceding the founding, sentencing was largely determinate, meaning
a person convicted of a particular crime was given a particular sentence, often
some form of corporal punishment or a specific fine.9 "A defendant knew from
the face of the charging instrument precisely what sentence she would receive if
convicted."'
Starting in the late eighteenth century, this model of punishment began to be
replaced by an indeterminate model wherein judges had discretion to impose any
sentence within a legislatively defined range." The impetus for this shift was the
desire to individualize sentencing and the recognition that "death and corporal
punishment were disproportionate penalties with little deterrent effect.' 2 Under
the indeterminate model, sentencing judges could base the sentence on both the
nature of the crime and the unique situation of the defendant. Under the former
model, it would not make sense to discuss a confrontation right at sentencing
because there would be no factfinding at sentencing and, therefore, no witnesses
to confront. The more difficult question is whether a defendant had a right to
confront adverse witnesses at sentencing in an indeterminate scheme.
To answer this question, it is necessary to keep in mind both the procedures
and the policies that developed. Procedurally, judges imposed sentences with
little or no guidance from a jury. '3 Blackstone writes that the court would exercise
its discretion based upon "the aggravations or otherwise of the offense, the
quality and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other cir-
cumstances,"' 4 but he does not specify if there were any limits on what sources a
judge could consider in determining this evidence. He does claim that
punishment within an indeterminate range was not wholly arbitrary, but the only
limit on judicial discretion that he cites is the prohibition on "excessive fines"
and "cruel and unusual punishments."' 5
9. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 376-77 (4th ed. 1967); Susan
R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 696-97
(2005).
10. Klein, supra note 9, at 696. Blackstone writes that once a person had been convicted, "the court [had
to] ... pronounce that judgment, which the law has annexed to the crime, and which has been constantly
mentioned, together with the crime itself." BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 376.
11. Klien, supra note 9, at 697. Professor Klein notes that "of the twenty-two federal crimes enacted by
the First Congress in 1790, only six required a determinate sentence of hanging." Id. Blackstone also
acknowledges the increasing use of indeterminate sentences in England. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 378-79.
12. Klein, supra note 9, at 697.
13. Id.
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 378.
15. Id.
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Two hundred years later, the United States Supreme Court in Williams v.
New York'6 described how sentencing in this indeterminate era generally worked.
Typically, a judge would "consider information about the convicted person's past
life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.' 7 Much of this
information would be gathered by probation officers "who ha[d] been trained not
to prosecute but to aid offenders."'" In conducting this investigation, probation
officers were permitted to gather information "outside the courtroom from
persons whom a defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-
examine."' 9 Often, probation officers would then communicate their findings to
the judge "in private and ex parte."2°
Prepared with this information the court would proceed to sentencing. One
judge described the sentencing procedure as follows:
The old informal system of indeterminate sentencing was not adversary
in nature.... There were no rules allocating burdens of proof between
the parties concerning the existence of sentencing facts, nor were there
rules concerning disclosure of the judge's sources of information. Most
important of all, the old system did not require the judge to find facts or
to base his sentence on the existence or nonexistence of a particular fact
or group of facts. The old nonadversary process did not require
factfinding because district judges had an absolute and unreviewable
discretion, so long as the sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory
maximum for the offense. Sentencing was an intuitive process. 2'
One of the motivations for this system was the widely held notion that courts
could "treat" sick offenders. This rehabilitative ideal arose in the late nineteenth
century,22 and the Williams Court explained its relevance at sentencing. Under
"prevalent modem philosophy of penology," the Court explained, "punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime. 23
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals
of criminal jurisprudence.
16. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
17, Id. at 245.
18. Id. at 249.
19. Id. at 245.
20. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1524 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Klein, supra note 9, at 698.
23. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
2006 / Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing
Modem changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary
now than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the
evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes. For
indeterminate sentences and probation have resulted in an increase in the
discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments. In general, these
modem changes have not resulted in making the lot of offenders harder.
On the contrary, a strong motivating force for the changes has been the
belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted
offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to
complete freedom and useful citizenship. This belief to a large extent has
been justified.24
In this context, the Court considered the constraints a judge faced when
"obtain[ing] information to guide him in the imposition of sentence upon an
already convicted defendant., 25 In Williams, the defendant had been convicted of
first-degree murder by a jury. The jury recommended a life sentence, but the
judge sentenced the defendant to death, relying in part on a report submitted by
the probation officer, which claimed the defendant was responsible for a number
of prior crimes for which he had not been convicted.
The Court did not look to the Confrontation Clause to decide whether the
trial court erred in relying on this evidence, presumably because the
26Confrontation Clause had not yet been incorporated against the states. Instead,
the Court looked only to the limited confrontation right of the Due Process
Clause, which required that "no person shall be tried and convicted of an offense
unless he is . . .afforded an opportunity to examine adverse witnesses. 27
Although such strictures were necessary to establish guilt, the Court reasoned
that "both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this
country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could
exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him
in determining the kind and extent of punishment.,
28
Enlightened by a rehabilitative model of punishment, the Court concluded
that such flexibility was necessary to ensure that punishment "fit the offender and
not merely the crime ' 29 and held that the Due Process Clause did not "command
that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking
24. Id. The last line of this passage underscores how unreliable Williams' sentencing policy is for
modem sentencing law. It was not too long after Williams that the Supreme Court recognized that empirical
studies actually suggested the rehabilitative effort was a failure. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
363 (1989) (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 24-43 (1974)).
25. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
26. This right would not be incorporated against the states until 1965 in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
27. Williams, 337 U.S. at 245 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 246.
29. Id. at 247.
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information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more
enlightened and just sentence."3" Because reliance on presentence reports rife
with hearsay was integral to the rehabilitative effort, the court decided to allow it:
"To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would undermine
modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted
throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation."3'
Eighteen years later, the Court revisited Williams in Specht v. Patterson,32
holding that due process required confrontation in sentencing proceedings that
effectively created "a separate criminal proceeding. 33 In Specht, the Court
reviewed a Colorado recidivist statute that authorized the state to increase the
sentence for a convicted sex offender based on the judge's conclusion at
sentencing that the offender "constitute[d] a threat of bodily harm to members of
the public, or [was] an habitual offender and mentally ill." 3 Prior to sentencing,
the defendant in Specht was examined by a psychiatrist and a report was given to
the trial judge.35 The court did not hold a hearing on the applicability of the
enhancement, so the defendant was unable to cross-examine the doctor about his
findings.36
The Court distinguished this sentence from that in Williams because it was
based on a "new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense
charged."37 As such, the enhancement created a "new charge leading to criminal
punishment '38 that entitled the defendant "to a full judicial hearing before the
magnified sentence was imposed," 39 including the right to confront witnesses
against him.40 Although the circuits would later discuss Williams and Specht to
hold that the Confrontation Clause did not apply at sentencing under the SRA, it
is significant that both of these cases discussed confrontation as a due process
right rather than looking to the text of the Confrontation Clause.
In this sentencing climate, Congress in 1970 codified the broad latitude that
federal judges enjoyed when finding facts for an indeterminate sentence: "No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
30. Id. at 250-51; see also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959) (holding that due process does
not require that evidence at sentencing be subject to cross-examination).
31. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
32. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
33. Id. at 609 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
34. Id. at 607 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (West 1963)).
35. Id. at 608.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 610.
39. Id. at 609 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
40. Id. at 610.
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appropriate sentence."4 ' Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly
42did not apply at sentencing, so the fact that testimony was hearsay did not
render it inadmissible at sentencing. Still, these authorities did not preclude the
possibility that evidence might be unconstitutional . 43
Only one circuit court considered whether the Confrontation Clause applied• 41
at an indeterminate sentencing." In United States v. Fatico,45 the Second Circuit
held it did not. Before the court was a well-reasoned decision by Judge
Weinstein, in which he rejected hearsay from a confidential source who claimed
the defendants had mob connections. In doing so, Judge Weinstein concluded
that the hearsay violated both the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses of the
Constitution.46
The latter concerns us here. After discussing the general significance of the
Confrontation Clause, Judge Weinstein noted that "[s]entencing is a critical,
often the most critical, stage of the criminal trial process" but that "[n]either the
history of the Sixth Amendment nor the case law delineate the reach of the
Amendment's protections for criminal defendants. 47 Citing Justice Harlan's
concurrence in California v. Green, s Judge Weinstein concluded that
the core of the Confrontation Clause is the requirement that the
prosecution produce a witness when he is available to testify. "There is
no reason in fairness why a State should not, as long as it retains a
traditional adversarial trial, produce a witness and afford the accused an
opportunity to cross-examine him when he can be made available.,
49
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1970).
42. FED. R. EvID. 1 101(d)(3).
43. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that, notwithstanding
these authorities, admissibility of evidence at sentencing may be limited by the Due Process or Confrontation
Clauses); Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 351 (1972) ("The rule
[excepting applicability of evidence rules to sentencing proceedings] is not intended as an expression as to when
due process or other constitutional provisions may require an evidentiary hearing.").
44. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707; United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that the
Supreme Court has held "that the constitutional guaranty of [the Sixth Amendment confrontation right] has no
application at the sentencing stage of a criminal prosecution"). This is not to say that the Second Circuit was the
only circuit pre-SRA to discuss a confrontation right at sentencing. Indeed, many courts discussed a defendant's
right to confront adverse witnesses at sentencing, but they considered only the requirements of the Due Process
Clause and did not address the applicability of the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Ammirato,
670 F.2d 552, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting due process challenge under Williams).
45. 579 F.2d 707; see also United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1085 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting
a Confrontation Clause challenge to the use of hearsay testimony at sentencing and citing Williams and Fatico).
46. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
About this fact, Judge Weinstein noted, "[m]embership in an organized crime family and other ties to
professional criminal groups are material facts that would and should influence the court's sentencing decision."
Id. at 1288.
47. Id. at 1296.
48. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
49. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 187 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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Accordingly, he concluded:
[T]he Confrontation Clause requires at least this: the government cannot
affirmatively prevent the defendant from examining under oath a
declarant when the declarant's knowledge is offered by the government
(1) at a critical stage of the criminal process, (2) as to crucial information
that (3) directly affects a substantial liberty interest of the defendant."
Because denying access "to an informant whose declarations are introduced as
evidence" was the same as "affirmatively prevent[ing] the defendant from
examining him," failure to call the confidential informant at sentencing violated
the defendants' rights under the Confrontation Clause.5
The Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded. Its more thorough
analytical efforts were devoted to dismissing Judge Weinstein's Due Process
Clause holding. Then, having done so, the court acknowledged, "it is not clear
whether, or to what extent, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is
implicated at sentencing . ,." Although the court quoted the text of the Sixth
Amendment,53 it said nothing about the text's significance, finding it
"unnecessary to differentiate between the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth.5 - 4 It
reasoned, "[b]oth constitutional safeguards, as applied in this context, are
directed at ensuring the fairness of criminal proceedings by defining the
situations in which confrontation by cross-examination must be afforded a
defendant."55 Thus, the "admission of an unidentified informant's corroborated
declarations in a sentencing proceeding where there is good cause for not
disclosing his identity is not barred by the Confrontation Clause. 56
Other than this brief discussion in Fatico, no other circuit in the
indeterminate era considered whether the Confrontation Clause applied at
sentencing independent of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, until the
passage of the SRA, judges had broad discretion to impose any sentence within
the statutory range on the basis of virtually any facts that were before them.
B. Mandatory Guideline Sentencing
While the era of indeterminate, rehabilitative sentences gave judges broad
discretion to "help" defendants by tailoring sentences to their individual cir-
cumstances, by the early 1970s, many began to question the utility of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Fatico, 579 F.2d at 713, rev'g 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
53. Id. at 713 n.15.
54. Id. at 714.
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
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indeterminate sentencing and its rehabilitative aims. 7 The most troubling
observation was that defendants in different courts were receiving different
sentences for similar crimes. Furthermore, it was unclear whether sentencing
practices were having any rehabilitative effect. This observation was particularly
troubling when seen in the context of a parole system that gave early release to
many defendants who seemed unrehabilitated.
As a result, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),
which marked a dramatic shift in sentencing policy and instituted significant
substantive and procedural reforms. Reacting to the failed psychology of the
sixties and seventies, Congress all but rejected the rehabilitative ideal, focusing
instead on retribution and deterrence." The legislative history of the SRA stated:
Recent studies suggest that [the rehabilitative] approach has failed, and
most sentencing judges as well as the Parole Commission agree that the
rehabilitation model is not an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions.
We know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate
individuals on a routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or
when a particular person has been rehabilitated.5 9
Furthermore, courts were admonished that "imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."60
Substantively, the biggest change was the creation of a mandatory guideline
system that limited judicial discretion within the statutory range. Congress created an
administrative agency, the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"),
which was charged with promulgating a comprehensive set of sentencing
"guidelines.,, 6' By statute62 and by judicial interpretation,63 sentencing judges were
required to sentence a convicted defendant within the applicable guideline range.
Although a judge had some discretion to "depart" from the guideline range, that
discretion was limited by appellate courts.64
57. Klein, supra note 9, at 699.
58. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (requiring courts to consider retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation); see also United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 399 (8th Cir. 1992)
(noting that rehabilitation was subordinated to the end of the list).
59. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983).
60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (West 2000).
61. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West 2001).
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), stricken by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
200, 259 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (noting that Congress created a
"mandatory-guideline system" that "makes the Sentencing Commission's guidelines binding on the courts").
64. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234 (noting that judicial discretion to depart from the guideline range was so
limited that the availability of departures did not render the Guidelines advisory).
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A significant aspect of the mandatory guidelines was the notion of "real offense"
sentencing.6' In promulgating the Guidelines, the Commission had to decide
whether to base sentences upon the actual conduct in which the
defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or
convicted ("real offense" sentencing), or upon the conduct that
constitutes the elements of the offense with which the defendant was
charged and of which he was convicted ("charge offense" sentencing).
66
Concluding that the existing system was, "in a sense, a real offense system,"
the Commission initially created a real offense system that would have required
courts to use "quadratic roots and other mathematical operations" in imposing
61sentences. In the end, the Commission "moved closer to a 'charge offense'
system" that "has a number of real elements. ' 68 As then-Judge Breyer described
it:
A sentencing guideline system must have some real elements, but not so
many that it becomes unwieldy or procedurally unfair. The
Commission's system makes such a compromise. It looks to the offense
charged to secure the "base offense level." It then modifies that level in
light of several "real" aggravating or mitigating factors, (listed under
each separate crime), several "real" general adjustments ("role in the
offense," for example) and several "real" characteristics of the offender,
related to past record.69
Another proponent of the guideline system stated:
The relevant-conduct principle and cross-references between guidelines
often work to ensure that the offense level is based on the actual offense
behavior. For offenses like drug trafficking, theft, fraud, or tax evasion,
conduct from uncharged or dismissed counts is often aggregated through
application of the relevant conduct guideline section, lB 1.3(a)(2). ....0
65. It is unclear to what extent "real offense" sentencing was an innovation of the Guidelines. The
Guidelines claim it was not an innovation at all. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(a) (1987);
see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which they Rest,
17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, l1 (1988) (arguing that the "real offense system" preceded the Guidelines). Others,
however, suggest that if the concept itself was not an innovation, the undue emphasis of it certainly was. See
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1524-25 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C., dissenting).
66. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A4(a) (1987).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Breyer, supra note 65, at 11-12.
70. Paul J. Hofer, Plea Agreements, Judicial Discretion, and Sentencing Goals, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, FJC DIRECTIONS, No. 3, May 1992 at 3 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Accordingly, under the Guidelines, courts could consider all of a defendant's
"relevant conduct," which included "all acts and omissions committed, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant."" As a consequence, the Guidelines directed judges to consider facts
far beyond the elements of the charged offense.
Not only did a judge consider these facts, the facts had specific, measurable
effects on a defendant's sentence. Furthermore, by cross-referencing guidelines
for other crimes, a defendant convicted of one crime could be sentenced as if he
had been convicted of a much more serious crime.72
To facilitate this comprehensive sentencing calculus, Congress also enacted
extensive sentencing procedures. As before, a probation officer would "make a
presentence investigation of a defendant" and report the results of that
investigation to the court prior to sentencing.73 Presentence reports ("PSR")
would continue to identify relevant sentencing information for the judges and
they would also calculate the applicable guideline range under the Guidelines.74
The probation officer would then provide a preliminary report to both the
defendant and the government at least thirty-five days before sentencing, 75 during
which time both parties would have the opportunity to object to information
contained therein.76 Once the parties had raised and responded to any objections,
the probation officer would submit a final PSR to the court at least ten days
before sentencing.77 Frequently, these reports would "contain hearsay information
from confidential and unidentified sources.78
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB I.3(a)(1)(A) (1987).
72. The most notable example of this is the frequent cross reference to the homicide guidelines in cases
where a crime leads to the death of a victim. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2E2. I(C)(1)
(extortion); 2K1.4(c)(1) (arson); 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) (simple possession of a weapon). Interestingly, Blackstone
appears to disagree with this practice, at least in the context of perjury, and claims it is contrary to the English
mode of punishment. In his discussion of the penalties for perjury, he notes the French practice of making
perjury a capital offense where the perjury led to the death of an innocent victim. Even under ancient English
law, "[w]here indeed the death of an innocent person has actually been the consequence of such wilful perjury,
it falls within the guilt of deliberate murder, and deserves an equal punishment." BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at
138-39. However, under modem law,
the mere attempt to destroy life by other means not being capital, there is no reason than an attempt
by perjury should; much less that this crime should in all judicial cases be punished with death. For
to multiply capital punishments lessens their effect, when applied to crimes of the deepest dye; and,
detestable as perjury is, it is not by any means to be compared with some other offences, for which
only death can be inflicted.
Id. at 139.
73. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3552(a) (West 2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). The Act also authorized courts to
request an examination of the defendant prior to sentencing. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3552(b)-(c).
74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
75. Id. 32(e)(2).
76. Id. 32(f).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3552(d); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(g). Interestingly, the rule requires disclosure only seven
days prior to sentencing.
78. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (6th Cir. 1992).
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Perhaps the most significant innovation of the SRA was the requirement that
courts resolve objections to the PSR at an adversarial sentencing hearing.79 At
these hearings, courts would be required to resolve any factual disputes that
would affect the sentence.80 The court also would have to give the defendant and
his attorney an opportunity to "speak or present any information to mitigate the
sentence" and provide a similar opportunity to the government.' Either party
would be permitted to call witnesses.82 In short, the SRA turned federal
sentencing hearings into adversarial proceedings where judges heard testimony to
resolve hotly contested facts that had predictable consequences for a defendant's
sentence.
Given these procedural changes, it should be no surprise that defendants
again asked courts to let them cross-examine the people whose stories would so
dramatically affect their punishments, but this time they argued under the
Confrontation Clause. For the first time courts considered that the Confrontation
Clause might apply at sentencing, but in the end, every circuit rejected this
view.83 The rationale for these decisions will be discussed more fully below, but a
few observations can be made here. The most troubling observation is that
although a few cases cited the text of the Sixth Amendment, no court seriously
wrestled with its meaning. Another surprising characteristic was that the courts
agreed that the changes implemented by the SRA had no constitutionally
significant effect on sentencing, a conclusion that is clearly erroneous in light of
Booker. Furthermore, courts did not seem troubled by the inapplicability of the
Confrontation Clause because of the established precedent that evidence at
sentencing must be reliable, coupled with the established policy that judges
needed a wide range of information at sentencing. Although these views can be
readily critiqued in hindsight, at the time, they commanded the unanimous assent
of the federal judiciary.84
C. Guided Sentencing
Of course, much of this changed on January 12, 2005. On that day, the
Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in United States v. Booker, holding
that the SRA changed federal sentencing in such a way that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury necessarily applied at sentencing. The main precedent
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 326)(3).
80. Id. 32(i)(3); Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1511.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4).
82. Id. 32(i)(2).
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84. These views were unanimous in the sense that a majority in every circuit to reach the question
rejected it. Two circuits, however, did so en banc after first taking a contrary view. United States v. Wise, 923
F.2d 86, rev'd by 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Silverman, 945 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd by
976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (1992) (en banc). The panel opinions in these cases and the dissenting opinions of Chief
Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit and Chief Judge Arnold of the Eighth express the better-reasoned view.
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for this holding was a prior case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 5 where the Court held
that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."86 Because Apprendi dealt with a statutory enhancement, circuit courts
rejected the claim that Apprendi applied to the Guidelines."
Four years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court did, in fact, apply Apprendi to
a sentencing scheme in Blakely v. Washington.s" There, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Washington's sentencing scheme that allowed a sentencing
judge to enhance a defendant's sentence based on judge-found facts that were
neither alleged in the indictment nor admitted in the guilty plea. The Court held
that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant."' 9 The Court reasoned that "the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings." 90 Based on this reasoning, the Court struck down the Washington law
that opened the door to an enhanced sentence based on judicial factfinding. 9'
The obvious implication of Blakely was that the federal sentencing scheme
must also be unconstitutional,92 and in Booker, the Supreme Court held that it
was. In a five to four majority, the same Justices that joined together in
Blakely (Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg) held in Booker
that the mandatory application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.93 Almost everyone anticipated this result: "The real debate in
Booker was not so much whether the Court would find a Sixth Amendment
violation, but rather what ought to be the proper remedy for such a violation.,
94
But, no one predicted the remedy.95
85. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
86. Id. at 490.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Wainright, 351 F.3d 816, 824 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Garcia, 252
F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2001).
88. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
89. Id. at 303.
90. Id. at 303-04.
91. Id. at 305.
92. See id. at 323 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion "casts constitutional
doubt" over the Guidelines); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238-42 (D. Utah 2004)
(striking the Guidelines as unconstitutional).
93. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
94. Timothy Lynch, One Cheer for United States v. Booker, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2004-2005 215, 224
(2005).
95. Most commentators expected that the Court would adopt one of the three remedies suggested in
Judge Paul G. Cassell's opinion in United States v. Croxford: (1) convene sentencing juries, (2) hold only the
enhancements unconstitutional, or (3) hold the Guidelines "unconstitutional in their entirety." 324 F. Supp. 2d
at 1242. No commentator or judge predicted the remedy the Court would ultimately impose.
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With the Court unanimous that the root of the problem was the mandatory
application of the Guidelines, 6 the other four Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer), joined by Justice Ginsburg, held that the
proper remedy would be to strike those portions of the SRA that made the Guidelines
binding at sentencing: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which required sentencing judges
to stay within the guideline range, and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which authorized
circuit courts to review sentencing decisions de novo.97
One interesting aspect of this remedy opinion was its severability analysis, which
left the remainder of the SRA intact."' As a result, sentencing courts are guided by the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), one of which is the Guidelines. 99 District
courts should still consult the Guidelines, but they are not be bound by guideline
determinations, and they should impose a sentence consistent with all of the factors
in § 3553(a).' °° Because sentences are largely discretionary, circuit courts should
review sentences only for reasonableness.''
Booker said very little about what procedures a district court should follow at
sentencing, but a few observations can be made. Most significantly, because the
various provisions that made sentencing unconstitutional under the SRA can be
severed, the Guidelines and other procedures are left in place. As a result, not much
has changed at this point: "[A] year later, as revealed by numerous district and circuit
court opinions and cumulative post-Booker data, the conversion of the guidelines
from mandatory to advisory has not significantly altered the central features of
federal sentencing."'' 2 The Guidelines themselves have not been modified, other than
the ordinary, annual amendments;' °3 only their application has been impacted. Now,
district courts should consider the Guidelines but may impose any sentence within
the legislative range, subject to the considerations in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.'°1
As for procedure, nothing has changed. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32 is still intact, which means that probation officers must still do a presentence
investigation and compile a PSR.'°5 Because the district court must consider the
Guidelines, the PSR must still include a guideline calculation.'06 Also, district
courts must still resolve all factual disputes that are relevant to the guideline
96. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 ("If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory
provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing
sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.").
97. Id. at 245, 259.
98. Id. at 246-49.
99. Id. at 259-60.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 260-62.
102. Douglas Berman, Same Old Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26. 2005, at 35 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
103. Surprisingly, the most recent Guidelines do not even mention Booker.
104. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)-(d).
106. Id. 32(d)(1).
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calculation, 0 7 and as before, the forum to do this is an adversarial hearing.' 8 Most
significantly, one by one, circuit courts are imposing the same de novo standard
of review for guideline calculations and holding that sentences will be reversed
for guideline calculation error without regard to whether the sentence was
reasonable.'°9
With this procedural backdrop, we return to the central issue of this article-
whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing-and introduce Crawford
v. Washington, another landmark Supreme Court case issued just a few months
before Blakely." ° In Crawford, the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding
rule in Ohio v. Roberts"' that out-of-court statements must fall within an
established hearsay exception or be otherwise reliable in order to survive a
Confrontation Clause challenge."2 Instead, the Court adopted a rule that
"testimonial hearsay" could only be admitted if (1) the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and (2) the declarant was unavailable
to testify at trial." 3
In response to both Crawford and Booker, circuit courts are now considering
whether the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford, applies at
sentencing. So far, the circuits have unanimously held it does not."4 For the most
part, courts are uncritically returning to the Confrontation Clause cases from the
mandatory guideline era, pointing out that since Crawford dealt with a trial right,
nothing in Crawford requires them to revisit their precedent that the
Confrontation Clause did not apply at sentencing.
In contrast to these decisions, one district court concluded that Crawford was
relevant to the question but then relied on Booker to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause still did not apply. In United States v. Gray,"5 the court
acknowledged that Crawford" has breathed new life into the debate."
'" 6
However, while an argument could be made that "the Guidelines closely simulate
107. Id. 32(i)(3)(B).
108. Id. 2(i)(4)(A).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Bothun, 424 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Post-Booker we continue to
review the court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.");
United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 346 (2d Cir. 2005) ("When reviewing a district court's application of
the Guidelines in the post-Booker era, we examine questions of law de novo and issues of fact for clear error.");
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir. 2005) ("We retain 'the same jurisdiction to review
guidelines sentences as [we] had before the Supreme Court's decision in Booker.' In considering the application
of the sentencing guidelines, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and its legal
determinations de novo." (quoting United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005))).
110. Perhaps the most notable feature of Crawford and Blakely is not their temporal and geographic
proximity but the fact that they were argued by Jeffrey L. Fisher of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Seattle,
Washington, a thirty-three-year-old commercial lawyer making his first appearances before the Supreme Court.
111. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
112. Id. at 66.
113. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 36, 68-69 (2004).
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
116. Id. at 724.
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trials so as to require the same procedural protections," such arguments "have
been significantly undermined by the Booker remedy that makes the Guidelines
advisory.""' 7 Accordingly, the court decided that any Sixth Amendment problem
was remedied by Booker.
Thus, it appears that courts must be persuaded of two significant issues
before they will apply Crawford at sentencing. First, they must be persuaded to
revisit their own precedents on the basis that either they were misguided from the
start or they were implicitly overruled by Crawford and Booker. Second, they
must be persuaded that the Confrontation Clause continues to apply at
sentencing, notwithstanding the remedy in Booker. I discuss each issue in turn.
III. THE CONFRONTATION QUESTION Is NOT SETTLED
Despite the fact that circuit precedent from the mandatory guideline era is
unanimous, several reasons exist for reconsidering it. First, it fails to seriously
engage the text of the Sixth Amendment. Second, the SRA fundamentally
changed the federal criminal system, requiring confrontation. Third, it is based on
an erroneous understanding of the Confrontation Clause. Finally, it is based on
now-rejected sentencing policy." 8
A. Courts Ignored the Sixth Amendment
The first problem with the pre-Booker precedent is that courts did not
seriously engage the text of the Sixth Amendment in holding that the
Confrontation Clause did not apply at sentencing. The Confrontation Clause
states that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him."" 9 Accordingly, the starting point
ought to be whether sentencing is a criminal prosecution for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment. 120
117. Id. at 725.
118. In the early 1990s, several law review articles raised many of the points I raise here, arguing that
the SRA and USSG required application of the Confrontation Clause at sentencing. See, e.g., Edward R.
Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation
and Due Process Clauses be Applied?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1993); Note, An Argument for Confrontation
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992); David A. Hoffman, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DUKE. L.J. 382 (1992); Matthew E. Johnson, Criminal
Constitutional Law-Eighth Circuit Applies the Confrontation Clause at a Sentencing Hearing-United States
v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 829 (1991).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
120. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 406 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting) ("The
interpretation of any written document, including the Constitution, should begin with its words, though it will
rarely end there."); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("An
initial question is whether sentencing is part of a criminal proceeding.").
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Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue'21 and the
circuits have only half-heartedly done so. The Third Circuit dismissed this issue
in a single line: "As a textual matter, the sixth amendment, which refers to
'criminal prosecutions,' arguably applies only at trial.' 22 Without any further
discussion, the court noted but declined to resolve the most critical dispute on
this issue. If it was wrong, and the Sixth Amendment applied more broadly than
just at trial, then the rest of the opinion would be wrong too. Like a runner who
misses third base, the holding cannot stand until courts return to touch the bag.
Until this critical issue is resolved, any other reasons not to apply the
Confrontation Clause at sentencing are immaterial.
At first blush, it appears the Seventh Circuit was resolving this precise issue
when it stated, "[a] sentencing hearing, however, is not a 'criminal prosecution'
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because its sole purpose is to
determine only the appropriate punishment for the offense, not the accused's
guilt.' 23 However, closer scrutiny makes clear that the Seventh Circuit also failed
to seriously engage the text. As for its stated reason, while it is true that a
sentencing hearing is not technically about guilt or innocence, it is certainly
about raising and resolving factual disputes about what a defendant really did.
Offense conduct beyond the scope of the elements of the charged offense is
highly relevant at sentencing, particularly under the SRA. 124 In a sense,
sentencing is about determining guilt because it allows a judge to assess a
defendant's blameworthiness on a scale of moral culpability. The fact that two
defendants are guilty of the same offense does not mean that they deserve the
same punishment.2 Even in an indeterminate sentencing scheme, testimony at
sentencing about a defendant's role in the offense, the weapons he used, or his• 126
purpose for committing the crime, will impact the sentence he receives. The
121. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3d Cir. 1900) (inviting the Supreme
Court to resolve the Confrontation Clause question); Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 725. But see Mitchell v. United
States, 526 U.S. 314, 338 (1999) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1948), for
the proposition that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing). Significantly, the Court in Mitchell
considered whether sentencing is part of a "criminal case" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, concluding
that "a sentencing hearing is part of the criminal case." Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
122. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102 (emphasis added).
123. United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994).
124. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.3 (defining relevant conduct).
125. Judge Becker made this point in Kikumura:
[I]t is self-evident that an internationally trained terrorist who is bent on murdering scores of
innocent civilians should be sentenced far more severely than a duly licensed explosives merchant
who knows that one of his customers intends to blow up an abandoned warehouse in order to
commit insurance fraud, even if each of these defendants is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) for
transporting explosives "with the knowledge or intent that [they] will be used to kill ... any
individual or unlawfully to... destroy any building."
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099.
126. For example, Judge Weinstein, when sentencing alleged mobsters during the indeterminate era
stated, "[m]embership in an organized crime family and other ties to professional criminal groups are material
facts that would and should influence the court's sentencing decision." United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp.
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Seventh Circuit offers no satisfactory explanation why the formal distinction
between trial and sentencing would make only the former a prosecution.
The Seventh Circuit's cited authority also fails to support its conclusion that
sentencing is not a "prosecution" under the Sixth Amendment. The only case
cited for this proposition is United States v. Wise,' 27 an en banc decision from the
Eighth Circuit. While it is true that Wise also held the Confrontation Clause
inapplicable at sentencing, it did not consider whether a sentencing hearing was a
"prosecution" under the Sixth Amendment. It did not even quote the Sixth
Amendment:' 28 "Just as increasing a defendant's sentence on the basis of relevant
conduct does not constitute a conviction for a separate offense, so also
establishing a defendant's role in the offense on which he has been convicted
does not constitute a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause."'29 If the Eighth Circuit intended this language to elucidate
the Sixth Amendment, it is odd that it would do so without quoting the
amendment or otherwise tying the claim to the constitutional text.
Even assuming that this language was intended as a discussion of the Sixth
Amendment, we see that the analysis fails. While the second clause of this
statement may be true in the abstract, it is not true when considered in the context
of modem sentencing. It is probably true that a hearing convened solely for the
purpose of considering a person's role in the commission of some crime (i.e., was
he a "leader/organizer") is not a criminal prosecution because that fact is not, by
itself, criminal. The problem is that abstract fact resolution is not the sole purpose
of sentencing hearings. Sentencing hearings under the SRA certainly are intended
to resolve disputed facts, such as a person's role in the commission of a crime, in
the context of a criminal prosecution. The purpose of such aggravating facts,
however, is to enhance a defendant's sentence, whether by operation of some
guideline provision or as an act of judicial discretion, and the resolution of
factual disputes has important consequences for the prosecution of a defendant. It
simply does not make sense to say that these factual disputes are not part of the
prosecution.
One final example of circuit courts not addressing the text of the Sixth
Amendment is the Tenth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Beaulieu.'30 There
the court stated, "It]he Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutional
requirements mandated in a criminal trial as to confrontation and cross-
examination do not apply at non-capital sentencing proceedings."' 3' Reading this
statement, we would expect the cited authorities to point us to some Supreme
Court exposition of the significance of the Sixth Amendment, but as noted above,
1285, 1288 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
127. 976 F.2d 393, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
128. Id. at 408 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 400-01. Part II.C explores in greater detail why the first part of this statement is incorrect.
130. 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 1180 (footnote omitted).
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the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. The cited authority is simply
another Tenth Circuit case,'32 which in turn relied on Williams for the proposition
that "[i]t seems clear from these decisions that the requirements mandated in a
criminal trial as to confrontation and cross-examination are not applicable at
sentencing proceedings. The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."'33
But Williams said nothing about the Confrontation Clause. By reading earlier
authorities as if they had resolved this constitutional issue, the pre-Booker courts
have perpetuated the critical failure. Because no court has grappled with the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, circuit courts should welcome the opportunity
to resolve this issue in the wake of Crawford and Booker.
B. The SRA Fundamentally Changed the Federal Criminal System and
Implicated the Confrontation Clause
Besides the courts' failure to engage the Sixth Amendment, they missed the
mark when it came to deciding the implications of the SRA. Following the
passage of the SRA, courts were willing to consider whether the SRA made
federal sentencings so trial-like that confrontation was required. Every court to
reach this issue concluded it did not. '34 These authorities are indisputably wrong
in light of Booker.
The main Supreme Court authority that opened the door to this argument was
Specht v. Patterson.'35 As discussed above,' 36 this case discussed a statutory
sentencing enhancement based on a judicially found fact. Because the enhancement
created a "new charge leading to criminal punishment,"' 37 the defendant "was entitled
132. Id. (citing United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir. 1987)).
133. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1543. For the proposition that confrontation is not required at sentencing,
the court also cites Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), which was a due process case that said nothing
about the Confrontation Clause. For the proposition that "[tihe right to confrontation is basically a trial right,"
the court also cited Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972), which in turn relied on Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968). Barber is the source of this language, but should not be relied on as a final word on whether
the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. At issue in Barber was whether the government could introduce
testimony from an unavailable witness who testified at the preliminary hearing. The defendant chose not to
cross-examine him at the hearing, and the government argued that the defendant had waived his confrontation
ight at trial by choosing not to cross-examine him at that time. The Court ultimately found a confrontation
violation on a rationale that looks a lot like Crawford. More than anything, the point of this language was that
since the incentives at a preliminary hearing are different from at trial, the Court would have found a
Confrontation Clause violation even if the defendant had chosen to cross-examine him then. It is in this context
that the Court stated: "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right." Barber 390 U.S. at 725. Because the
applicability of the right at sentencing was not before the court, it cannot be read so broadly as to exclude that
possibility.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[A]II seven [circuits to
consider this question] have held that the confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing, notwithstanding the
enactment of the Guidelines.").
135. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
136. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
137. Specht, 386 U.S. at 610.
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to a full judicial hearing before the magnified sentence was imposed,"' 38 including the
right to confront witnesses against him.'39 In light of Specht, courts acknowledged
that "where the sentencing phase constitutes 'a separate criminal proceeding' ... due
process requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses."'" Accordingly, the circuits seemed willing to require confrontation at
sentencing if "the application of the Guidelines has so changed the sentencing phase
that it now constitutes a separate criminal proceeding to which the right of
confrontation applies.'"'
Nevertheless, all courts to reach this issue rejected it. The Eighth Circuit in Wise
discussed several changes wrought by the SRA and concluded that none of them so
fundamentally changed sentencing that confrontation was required.' 42 Its most
notable observation was that although "the protections of the right of confrontation
apply at the guilt phase, ... it does not follow that the same protections apply at
sentencing simply because facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant's
sentence."'' 3 Oddly, the court did acknowledge that "in certain instances a sentence
may so overwhelm or be so disproportionate to the punishment that would otherwise
be imposed absent the sentencing factors mandated by the Guidelines that due
process concerns must be addressed."'" The court continued, "[t]his may occur
where a defendant's sentence is so greatly increased as a result of considering
relevant conduct that the conduct essentially becomes an element of the offense for
which the defendant is being punished."' 4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that changes under the SRA did not require
confrontation: "While a number of considerations have changed, we are of the view
that the permissible methods of informing the sentencing judge and the need for
information in fashioning sentences in light of the constitutional rights of defendants
at sentencing have not essentially changed."' 6 The Seventh Circuit also wrote that
"even with the dramatic changes in the sentencing process brought about by the
Sentencing Guidelines, the pre-Guidelines policy of allowing sentencing courts to
obtain all relevant sentencing information without the strictures of the right of
confrontation remains intact."' 47 Noting that pre-SRA cases had consistently allowed
hearsay at sentencing, the Tenth Circuit likewise stated, "[w]e find nothing in the
Guidelines to suggest that a different rule now applies."'"
138. Id. at 609 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
139. id. at 610.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Specht, 386 U.S. at
609).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 398-401.
143. Id. at 400.
144. Id. at 401.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1508 (6th Cir. 1992).
147. United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994).
148. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1990).
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The problem with this reasoning is that Booker makes clear that the SRA as
originally enacted did turn sentencing hearings into mini trials that required full
Sixth Amendment protection. The Court acknowledged that sentencing courts
have typically enjoyed broad discretion in imposing sentences within a statutorily
defined range) 49 However, because the SRA made the Guidelines mandatory,
judicial discretion was limited to within the guideline ranges.'5° As such, the top
of the guideline range became the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes,
and facts found at sentencing could increase that statutory maximum without any
constitutional protections. 5' Accordingly, the SRA unconstitutionally deprived
defendants of the right to have a jury find these facts.1 2 Because the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial was required under the SRA as enacted, it
follows a fortiori that the Confrontation Clause was also required under the SRA.
Applying this analysis in hindsight, it is surprising that courts did not
recognize sooner that sentencing enhancements under the SRA, like the one in
Specht, were based on "a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the
offense charged. ' 5' In light of Booker, there can be no doubt that the SRA turned
federal sentencing into the type of hearing where the "full panoply" of trial rights
was required, "including the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him."' 5 4 Because the cases that held the Confrontation Clause inapplicable
under the SRA reached exactly the opposite conclusion, Booker demands that
courts reexamine this precedent. Even if they ultimately conclude, like the
district court in Gray, that the Booker remedy cured any Confrontation Clause
defects in the SRA,5 5 they should consider the issue in the full light of Booker
and not rely uncritically on arguably overruled precedent.
C. Crawford Clarified the Meaning of the Confrontation Clause
Another reason for courts to reexamine this question is that they relied on an
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that has now been repudiated. Two
aspects of Crawford have implications at sentencing. First, Crawford made clear
that the Confrontation Clause was intended to do more than just guarantee the
reliability of testimony. Second, a corollary to the first point, hearsay rules are
irrelevant as to whether out-of-court statements can constitutionally be admitted.
149. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 235-36.
152. Id. at 244.
153. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,608 (1967) (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 609-10 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir.
1966)).
155. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
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1. Reliability Is Irrelevant to the Confrontation Clause
Prior to Crawford, the touchstone of the Confrontation Clause was reliability.
Under Ohio v. Roberts, a statement by an unavailable witness was "admissible
only if it [bore] adequate 'indicia of reliability' because it fell "within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness."
'5 6
In light of this understanding of the Confrontation Clause, it is not surprising
that courts decided it did not apply at sentencing. Although sentencing courts
could generally consider hearsay, due process required that hearsay "have some
minimal indicium of reliability," otherwise it could not be considered without
confrontation." 7 Citing Roberts, the Third Circuit noted that "the confrontation
clause imposes a higher constitutional standard of admissibility [at trial] than
[due process does] at sentencing,""'5 but given the emphasis on reliability in both
places, it is hard to see the distinction. Still, apparently recognizing the unfairness
of relying on unchallenged testimony, the Third Circuit concluded that "due
process requires more than a 'minimal indicium of reliability"' and imposed a
"heightened [due process] test" that required a sentencing court to "examine the
totality of the circumstances, including other corroborating evidence, and
determine whether the hearsay declarations are reasonably trustworthy."'' 9
However, because the stated concern for both the Due Process Clause and the
Confrontation Clause was reliability, it was hard to see much difference between
the two standards. The Eighth Circuit stated that the reliability standard "fulfills
the Confrontation Clauses' basic purpose of promoting the integrity of the
factfinding process." ' 60 Similarly, pre-SRA the Second Circuit concluded it was
"unnecessary to differentiate between the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth,"
because at sentencing "[b]oth constitutional safeguards ... are directed at
ensuring the fairness of criminal proceedings by defining the situations in which
confrontation by cross-examination must be afforded a defendant."' 6' Because
due process required a showing of reliability, it was easy for courts to conclude
that due process reliability standards were enough.
However, Crawford makes clear that the Confrontation Clause was intended
to do more than just protect defendants from being punished based on unreliable
evidence. The Supreme Court stated that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,
156. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
157. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Baylin,
696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982)); see also United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1992).
158. Kikumura,918F.2dat 1102.
159. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
160. Wise, 976 F.2d at 402.
161. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 714 (2d Cir. 1978).
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and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused."' 62 Notably, this statement of purpose says nothing to imply that the evil
was limited to trial settings. The evil was the use of ex parte examinations
against the accused. Certainly, offering evidence at sentencing with the purpose
of increasing a defendant's sentence is "us[ing] ... evidence against the
accused." Moreover, it would hardly seem fair to allow Congress to circumvent
this protection by making certain facts "sentencing facts" rather than actual
elements of the crime.
2. Hearsay Rules Are Irrelevant Under the Confrontation Clause
Another problem with the pre-Crawford approach to confrontation was that it
was tied to hearsay. Under Roberts, out-of-court testimony did not violate the
confrontation clause if it fell within a well-established hearsay exception.
63
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply at sentencing, hearsay was
admissible at sentencing,' 6' so it did not make much sense to reinstate a hearsay
analysis at sentencing via the Confrontation Clause. 
65
Crawford also repudiates the notion that interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause is tied to hearsay rules. The court stated:
[W]e once again reject the view that... its application to out-of-court
statements introduced at trial depends upon 'the law of Evidence for the
time being.' Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law
of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent
even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices. '66
The Court continued:
This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment's core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be
unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under
hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the
Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations
might sometimes be admissible under modern hearsay rules, but the
Framers certainly would not have condoned them.'67
Thus, while it is true that sentencing judges are not constrained by the rules
of evidence, the inapplicability of the rules is no reason to allow the government
162. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
163. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
164. See FED. R. EVID. 1 101 (d)(3).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1990).
166. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting 3 WIGMORPEsupra note 1, § 1397, at 101) (citation ornitted).
167. Id. at 51.
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to penalize defendants based on ex parte examinations that the Constitution
forbids. Nor is the fact that such examinations may be deemed "reliable" by pre-
Crawford standards justification to rely on them. Because Crawford "marks a
fundamental shift in the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
' ' 68
courts should certainly revisit their prior holdings that stem, in part, from the
former, mistaken understanding of this right. 69
D. The SRA Changed the Policy Basis for Rejecting Confrontation
A final reason to reconsider the pre-Booker cases is that they dismiss the
reality that modem sentencing policy has also shifted fundamentally since
Williams. At the core of the rule to allow hearsay at sentencing was the
rehabilitative ideal, the "prevalent modem philosophy of penology that the
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime."'7 Because reliance
on presentence reports rife with hearsay was integral to the rehabilitative effort,
the court decided to allow it: "To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of
information would undermine modem penological procedural policies that have
been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and
experimentation."1
7'
The problem with this foundation is that with the passage of the SRA,
rehabilitation was rejected as the primary aim at sentencing. Indeed, the "impetus"
for the SRA was "the consensus that developed in the 1970s that the hoped-for
rehabilitation of offenders was simply not taking place."'' 72 Contrary to the Supreme
Court's earlier view in Williams, it ultimately conceded that "[r]ehabilitation as a
sound penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by
some as an unattainable goal for most cases."' 173 Thus, although rehabilitation
remained a consideration, it was subordinate to the other theories of punishment.'
74
The problem with this theoretical shift in sentencing is that it undermines the
reliability of precedent that traces its roots to Williams: "Case law is based on reason,
and if the reason justifying the result of a case ceases to exist, the case loses its
authority.' 75 While it is true the SRA did not change the need for judges to rely on a
168. United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237 n.2 (10th Cit. 2005).
169. See United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) ("Crawford ...has
breathed new life into the debate.").
170. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
171. Id. at 250.
172. United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1282 (D. Utah 2005).
173. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (citing NORVAL, supra note 24, at 24-43;
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981)); see also Robert Martinson, What
Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) ("Rehabilitation, tested
empirically, is a failure; 'nothing works' as a prison reform program to reduce recidivism.").
174. See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 399 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
(2000)).
175. Id. at 408 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
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broad range of information at sentencing,'76 the theoretical shift produced a legal shift
that gave identified, aggravating facts specific, measurable significance at sentencing.
Under the new policy, sentencing is no longer a vague attempt to "treat" a sick
member of society. Now, the focus is on measured proportionality between the crime
and the punishment and mathematical uniformity between apparently similar cases.17
One judge noted:
The Williams opinion makes clear that the decision is intended to allow the
"modem" theories of "indeterminate," "individualized," "discretionary"
intuitive sentencing designed to "rehabilitate" the offender to be put into
practice without constitutional limitations that could undermine the
experiment. The Court contrasted the new, more "humane" system of
rehabilitation with the previous harsh system of determinate sentencing
based on retribution and deterrence. The "new" experimental system.., is
now the "old" system-characterized, it is said, by unconscionable
"disparity."'7 8
Given these policy shifts, courts ought to ask whether their precedents adequately
take into account current attitudes about the theories of punishment.
IV. POST-BOOKER CONFRONTATION CLAUSE RIGHTS AT SENTENCING
A. The Sixth Amendment Requires Confrontation at Sentencing
Assuming that courts are persuaded to revisit this issue, the question becomes
how to handle it. Contrary to the approach in previous cases, the starting point for
this analysis is the text of the Sixth Amendment.'79 The Sixth Amendment states: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."' The fundamental issue ought to be "whether
sentencings are 'criminal prosecutions' for Sixth Amendment purposes,""'8 but as
noted above, no federal court has ever directly addressed this question.
176. Id. at 399 ("[Post-SRA,] the sentencing judge still considers information not strictly relevant to a
defendant's guilt and needs to conduct a broad inquiry to obtain that information.").
177. See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
(2000) (making uniformity one of the legislative objectives of sentencing).
178. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1526 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Wise, 976 F.2d at 406 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting) ("The interpretation of any written
document, including the Constitution, should begin with it words, though it will rarely end there."); United
States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("An initial question is whether
sentencing is part of a criminal prosecution.").
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
181. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725 (S.D. W. Va. 2005); Wise, 976 F.2d at 406
(Arnold, CJ., dissenting).
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1. Structure of the Sixth Amendment
The best clue for solving this puzzle is found in the structure of the Sixth
Amendment itself. The full text of the Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."'
Note that the introductory clause, "in all criminal prosecutions," prefaces all
of the rights listed in this amendment. Had the drafters intended to limit these
rights to trials, they would not have needed to explicitly limit the first set of
rights-speed and an impartial jury-to trials. The fact that some of the rights in
the Sixth Amendment are limited to trials and others are not suggests that only
those rights that are expressly limited to trials should be limited to trials. The
other rights ought to apply at every stage of a criminal prosecution.
This analysis helps explain the observation by circuit courts that some but
not all of the Sixth Amendment rights are limited to trial. In rejecting the
Confrontation Clause at sentencing, courts would cite the various components of
the Sixth Amendment and then say, "[m]any of these rights, applicable at trial,
are not applicable to the sentencing process," without explaining why the right to
counsel applied at sentencing when the right to a jury did not.183 The answer is in
the structure of the Sixth Amendment. Unlike the jury right, which is expressly a
trial right, the right to counsel applies in all prosecutions, so it is natural that the
right to counsel would apply at sentencing when the right to a jury does not.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held as much: "The Sixth Amendment safeguards
to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of
the criminal process,"' 4 one of which is sentencing. 85 As such, courts have long
held that defendants have a right to counsel at sentencing. 
6
182. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183. See, e.g., Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1511.
184. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).
185. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("Even though the defendant has no
substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage
of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel." (citing Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967))).
186. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Significantly, in discussing this
rule, lower courts sometimes refer to those stages where the right to counsel applies at "'critical stages' of the
prosecution," which includes sentencing. Id. (emphasis added).
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Because the right to counsel and the right to confront adverse witnesses are
structurally similar, both rights should be equally applicable in criminal prosecutions.
Indeed, a very workable rule would be that the Confrontation Clause applies in those
settings where the right to counsel attaches--'critical stages"-which certainly
includes sentencing.87 At least one judge has argued that in reality, the right to
counsel is worthless without the right of confrontation since cross-examining
witnesses is a specialty of attorneys.' 8'
The best view, under the current criminal justice system, is to understand
"prosecutions" as the process by which members of society are held accountable for
their misdeeds, of which trial is just one phase. Unlike a trial, which ends with the
jury verdict (or is obviated by a guilty plea), a prosecution ends only with the entry of
the judgment.
Our approach toward plea agreements is consistent with this understanding. In a
case where the defendant pleads guilty, there is clearly no trial, but we would not say
in the absence of a trial that there was no prosecution. To the contrary, we would
refer to the entire process of securing the criminal judgment as the prosecution.
Indeed, where a defendant pleads guilty to one count in exchange for the
government's promise to dismiss other counts, the government will typically not
dismiss the other counts until after the defendant has been sentenced, confirming that
until the defendant has been sentenced, the prosecution is not yet over.
2. Original Understanding of the Term "Prosecution"
This structural analysis is the best clue as to what the founders understood by
the term "prosecution," but it is not the only clue. Scholars concerned with an
original understanding of the term "prosecution" are likely to ask how the term
was understood by the participants in the original constitutional debates, as
demonstrated by their writings-such as the Federalist Papers"89-- or by the
scholarly legal literature of the time-such as William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which was widely read and relied on by
the founders.'9g The Federalist Papers do not define the term "prosecution," and
the context in which the word is used would make sense referring either just to
trial or to the entire process.' 9'
187. See United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the Con-
frontation Clause applies when hearsay "is offered by the government... at a critical stage of the criminal
process").
188. States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("What is the point of
having counsel if counsel cannot exercise an essential function of counsel-the cross-examination of the
witnesses against counsel's client?").
189. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38
(Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).
190. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century
American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 189, 193 (1984).
191. The Federalist Papers frequently use the term in connection with the impeachment of federal
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Blackstone is more helpful. An immediate observation is that the term
"prosecution" has multiple meanings, one of which clearly seems to refer to the
entire process of criminally punishing a member of society. Book Four of his
Commentaries devotes a chapter to each of the twelve stages of this process,
which he calls "the regular and ordinary method of proceeding in the courts of
criminal jurisdiction."' 92 The list of these twelve stages is inunediately startling
because it uses the term "prosecution" in a way we would not expect. The twelve
stages are "1. Arrest; 2. Commitment and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5.
Arraignment, and its incidents; 6. Plea, and issue; 7. Trial, and conviction; 8.
Clergy; 9. Judgment, and its consequences; 10. Reversal of judgment; 11.
Reprieve, or pardon; 12. Execution."'93
It is surprising to see the term "prosecution" placed third because, if
anything, it ought to replace "trial and conviction" in the list. Clearly, the
meaning of "prosecution" as used in the third stage cannot be what the founders
meant when they used the same term in the Sixth Amendment. This stage is
described in Chapter 23, which is entitled "The Several Modes of Prosecution."
Once a person has been arrested and committed or released, Chapter 23 explains
that the "next step towards the punishment of offenders is their prosecution, or
the manner of their formal accusation."'94 This passage shows that the term
"prosecution," as used as one of the stages of the criminal process, refers to the
charging stage of the process. The Sixth Amendment would be nonsensical if we
concluded it applied only at the charging stage of a criminal case.
Blackstone's other uses of the term, however, suggest a broader
understanding. Earlier in the text, Blackstone uses the term "criminal prose-
cution" along with the term "civil suit,"' 95 suggesting a meaning that includes the
entire judicial process. In describing the twelve stages of the criminal process, he
refers to them as "stage[s] of the prosecution,"' 96 again suggesting that the term
refers to the entire process. Most notable is the ninth "stage of criminal
prosecution," which occurs "after trial and conviction are past, . . . which is that
of judgment."'97 The use of the term "prosecution" in this context is important
because it makes clear that Blackstone understood a "prosecution" to continue
beyond trial.
More importantly though, it makes clear that "prosecution" includes
sentencing. Although Blackstone never uses the term "sentencing" in his
discussion of the criminal process, the stage that he calls "judgment" is clearly
officers, stating that impeached officers could be subject to "prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course
of law." See The Federalist Nos. 65, 69 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
192. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 289.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 137.
196. Id. at 315, 317, 368.
197. Id. at 368.
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the stage that we would label sentencing. For one thing, it falls chronologically
right where sentencing falls under modem criminal procedure: between trial and
appeal. Moreover, Blackstone's description of what happens at "judgment" is
precisely what modem courts do at sentencing. Assuming that the defendant had
no legal argument to prevent imposing a sentence, once he had been convicted,
"the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law has annexed to the
crime."' 9' As discussed above, many of the sentences in Blackstone's day were
determinate. But other sentences were indeterminate, and courts would exercise
their discretion based on "the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the
quality and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other circum-
stances."'" The fact that Blackstone described this process as one stage of a
criminal prosecution supports the view that the founders understood
"prosecutions" to include sentencing.
3. Historical Application of the Confrontation Right
In addition to these clues in writings contemporaneous to the founding of the
country, another source for interpreting the Sixth Amendment is a historical view
of how the right to confrontation was applied in criminal cases. In Crawford, the
Court took such a historical approach to resolve the ambiguity in the phrase,
"witnesses against," by citing cases from sixteenth century England to discern
what concerns motivated the drafters to include this provision. 200 Similarly, the
Court in Williams noted, "both before and since the American colonies became a
nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a
sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to
be imposed within limits fixed by law."2°'
But Williams' historical analysis is unsupported. As for pre-founding courts,
it is true that judges could sentence based on "the aggravations or otherwise of
the offence, the quality and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other
circumstances, 2 2 but the Williams Court cites no authority to support the notion
that pre-founding courts regularly relied on hearsay in exercising their discretion.
As for post-founding practice, the fact that courts after the Constitution was
ratified denied confrontation at sentencing does not enlighten us at all as to the
founders' concerns when they adopted the Sixth Amendment. The only way post-
ratification precedent is relevant is if it is specifically interpreting the Sixth
Amendment, but Williams certainly did not do that, and I have explained above
why the circuit courts' interpretations were flawed.
198. Id. at 369.
199. Id. at 371.
200. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-50 (2004).
201. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1948).
202. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 378.
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While a historical analysis demonstrates neither concern for, nor acceptance
of, relying on hearsay at sentencing, the historical concerns that led to the
Confrontation Clause are certainly implicated at sentencing and suggest that the
founders would have found current sentencing practice to violate the Sixth
Amendment. Crawford emphasizes that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,
and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused."203 Using hearsay statements offered to aggravate a defendant's
sentence, under any model of sentencing, seems to violate this purpose.2'
In light of these observations, it should be clear that the Confrontation Clause
applies at sentencing under the terms of the Sixth Amendment. The notion of
"prosecution," as understood in the context of the Sixth Amendment and in legal
writing contemporaneous to the founding of this country, includes sentencing,
and structurally, the Confrontation Clause should apply with the same force as
the right to counsel. While it is not clear that the use of hearsay was either a
nagging concern or a widespread practice at the time of founding, the Supreme
Court has identified those considerations that motivated adoption of the clause,
and apply as much at sentencing as at trial.
B. The SRA Still Requires Confrontation at Sentencing
Should courts find this analysis inconclusive as to sentencing in general, it
must be clear after Booker that the Confrontation Clause certainly applies at
sentencings under the SRA . However, it is not inconceivable that the judicial
amendment to the SRA, which eliminated the jury requirement at sentencing,
also eliminated any Confrontation Clause requirement. The district court in
Gray took this approach:
Arguments that sentencings under the Guidelines closely simulate trials
so as to require the same procedural protections have been significantly
undermined by the Booker remedy that makes the Guidelines advisory.
Under the advisory system, the factual findings that I make at sentencing
no longer mandate a defendant's punishment with mathematical
precision. In the absence of such mandatory, fact-driven penalty
determinations, arguments for constitutional procedural protections at
203. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
204. Citing the same English cases that would later form the basis for Crawford's historical analysis,
Judge Arnold writes that "[wihat we do know [about the founders' intent] ... points towards recognizing the
right of confrontation." United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), rev'g United States
v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
205. See supra Part II.C.
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sentencing are weakened. Accordingly, I cannot find that I am required
to apply Crawford at sentencing.2 6
Thus, while Booker makes clear that the SRA as originally enacted required
Sixth Amendment protections, the Booker remedy obviated the need to apply the
Confrontation Clause at sentencing (a subtle reminder that the Supreme Court
giveth, and the Supreme Court taketh away).
This analysis, however, ignores the reality that federal sentencing has not
changed much since Booker. As noted above, the only modification was to strike
two provisions that made the Guidelines mandatory. Other than this revision, all
other substantive provisions and procedural rules were left in place. As a result,
sentencing in the wake of Booker has proceeded pretty much as before. Probation
officers still conduct presentence investigations and file their reports with the
court. Parties still object to the reports, both on factual and legal grounds. Courts
and parties still bicker over the meaning of the Guidelines in an adversarial
proceeding.
But, while the imposition of the Guidelines is no longer mandatory, the
application of the Guidelines is. Courts must still calculate the applicable range 1
7
and resolve all factual disputes that are relevant to the guideline calculation. 2 ' As
a result, some district courts have gone so far as to say that they will only impose
a non-guideline sentence "in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive
reasons." 2°9 Following suit, the circuits have concluded that guideline sentences
are presumptively reasonable, 2'0 and every circuit to speak on the issue has stated
that it will continue to review guideline calculations as before.2
In light of the Court's interpretation of what the Confrontation Clause was
intended to protect, it can hardly be said that Booker eliminated the need to
afford confrontation rights at sentencing. As noted above, "the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
the accused. 21 2 This evil, most certainly, can arise at sentencing post-Booker in
the same way as before: by using ex parte examinations against the accused. The
only impact of Booker is that the effect of such evidence on the sentence imposed
is not as measurably foreseeable as before because now the judge has the
discretion to disregard the ultimate guideline calculation if he chooses. However,
the judge does not have the discretion to misapply the guidelines, so if the
evidence is admitted, it will be incorporated into the guideline calculation. While
206. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 711, 725 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
207. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
208. FED. R. CRtM. P. 32(i)(3)(B); 18 U.S.C.A § 32(i)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2005).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln,
413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).
211. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
212. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
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the judge does not have to sentence within the Guidelines range, he is obligated
to consider that range in sentencing. Because sentencing continues to be
guideline centered, it follows that an increase in that range will naturally
aggravate the sentence ultimately imposed.
Perhaps the problem with the SRA and the Guidelines is that they call for
evidence of specific facts that lend themselves to proof by testimonial hearsay. In
particular, "offense characteristics" call for details about the defendant's conduct
that may extend far beyond the scope of the indictment. Proof of these facts will
be gathered through typical law enforcement investigations and presented
through the prosecutor to the probation officer for use in the presentence report.
Because these facts are so integral to the sentencing process, it does not make
sense to say that they are immune from constitutional protections simply because
Congress left them as "sentencing facts" rather than elements. Congress gave
them relevance and supreme importance at sentencing through the SRA.
Defendants should have the right to test their trustworthiness in the crucible of
cross-examination.
Thus, even if the Confrontation Clause does not compel its application at all
sentencing hearings, it certainly requires as much at federal sentencing hearings,
even under the revised SRA.
C. District Courts Should Apply Crawford as a Matter of Discretion
Should courts decide that the Confrontation Clause does not apply as a
matter of law, sentencing courts should nevertheless require confrontation as a
matter of discretion. The Gray court suggested this approach for "hotly contested
issues:"
In cases involving genuine disputes, my calculation of the advisory
Guideline range requires that I must first consider the available evidence
to resolve factual disputes and objections to the presentence report. The
adversarial system provides the best method of establishing the reliability
of testimonial evidence and the appropriate weight to assign to such
evidence. Accordingly, I strongly encourage the use of witness testimony
and cross-examination to resolve factual disputes at sentencing,
notwithstanding my finding that Crawford does not apply at sentencing
under the post-Booker sentencing regime.
213
Unfortunately, it is unclear what the court means by "hotly contested issues,"
and the opinion is silent as to the basis for the defendant's Confrontation Clause
challenge. Likely, the defendant was simply objecting to the general use of a PSR
that probably relied on information gathered from acquaintances and relatives.
This language suggests that the court would have required confrontation had the
213. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 711,725 (S.D. W. Va. 2005).
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evidence been dispositive of a factual dispute under the Guidelines.
In any event, Gray acknowledges the inherent authority that sentencing
judges have to hear and weigh evidence at sentencing. It is within a judge's
discretion as factfinder to reject unfounded evidence. For all of the reasons stated
above, sentencing judges can and should require confrontation as a matter of
discretion, especially where the hearsay is offered to prove an enhancement
under the Guidelines.
V. APPLYING CRAWFORD AT SENTENCING
The foregoing establishes that the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing
under the SRA, but what does this mean? The Williams Court was concerned that
"most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the
intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were
restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-
examination. '21 4 Another court refused to apply the Confrontation Clause,
reasoning, in part, that "[t]he type and extent of this information [contained in
presentence reports] make totally impractical if not impossible open court
testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay
criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues.",215 Two observations
suggest these concerns may be unfounded: (1) Crawford does not bar all hearsay;
and (2) under the SRA, the court must hear testimony on the evidence anyway, so
requiring confrontation will be a small burden on the courts.
A. Sentencing and Testimonial Hearsay
After Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not exclude all hearsay, and
since the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing, hearsay would be
admissible as long as it was not "testimonial. ,2 6 Thus, the practical implications
turn on how courts define "testimonial hearsay." Although the Supreme Court
declined to "spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial, ,,,27 it did
identify a number of situations that would be testimonial: "Whatever else the
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."2 8 The
Court also suggested other possible definitions. For example, it cited the
defendant's suggestion that it include "ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent," which he defined as "affidavits, custodial examinations,
214. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1948).
215. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1508 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at
250).
216. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially.,, 2'9 The Court also noted a proposal suggested years earlier in a
concurrence by Justice Thomas: "extrajudicial statements.., contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions." 220
Since Crawford, courts and critics have further defined "testimonial." The
Tenth Circuit recently concluded, "the 'common nucleus' present in the
formulations which the Court considered centers on the reasonable expectations
of the declarant. It is the reasonable expectation that a statement may be later
used at trial that distinguishes the flippant remark, proffered to a casual
acquaintance, from the true testimonial statement." 22' Other circuits have taken a
similar approach.22
Because Crawford applies only to "testimonial" hearsay, it does not impact
pre-Crawford standards of admissibility for non-testimonial hearsay.223 Once the
defendant is convicted, information gathered by a probation officer about a
defendant's background is probably not testimonial and could be admitted via the
probation officer or the PSR. On the other hand, information about the
underlying conduct, which typically would be gathered by law enforcement
officers, would be testimonial and subject to confrontation rights.224
B. Need to Offer Evidence at a Sentencing Hearing
Of course, defendants are likely to challenge the most damaging testimony
under the Confrontation Clause, and it is understandable that courts would not
want to open the door to one more challenge that will consume judicial resources.
However, the reality of federal sentencing is that once a defendant objects to an
219. Id. at 51.
220. Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
221. United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1302 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that declarants'
statements were not testimonial where they did not make them in the belief that they might later be used at
trial); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Crawford at least suggests that the
determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant's awareness or
expectation that his or her statements may later be used at trial."); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675
(6th Cir. 2004) ("The proper inquiry, then, is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the
accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the
crime.").
223. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (granting states flexibility to develop hearsay rules for "nontestimonial
hearsay").
224. See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern
Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 288 (2005) (arguing that "the distinction between, and distinctive
nature of, offense conduct and offender characteristics can and should directly inform the consideration of
sentencing purposes and procedures").
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allegation in a presentence report, the court must resolve that objection after a
hearing on the issue.2" Thus, the court will have to hear testimony from either the
probation officer who read the police report of the witness statement, the police
who took the statement, or the witness who made the statement. While the third
option may take a little longer-because the government attorney will have to lay
a foundation and set the stage-the first option does not eliminate the need to
convene a hearing or hear the evidence.
Two cases illustrate this point. In United States v. Luciano,226 a police officer
testified at sentencing that he had been told by a witness that the defendant
assaulted both the witness and the defendant's girlfriend with a gun. Although
the witness did not testify at trial, he testified before the grand jury. As a result of
this testimony, the defendant received a four-level enhancement based on the fact
that he had used the gun in connection with an assault with a deadly weapon.
Another example is United States v. Martinez,2' where an officer testified at
sentencing that witnesses claimed they had been in a fight with the defendant. In
both these cases, the testimony took up the court's time at a hearing; in both
cases, the government could have offered the testimony of the actual witness
rather than the testimony of an officer who lacked personal knowledge of the
facts he was testifying about.
On the other hand, requiring confrontation at sentencing allows courts to
impose sentences based on accurate information. Although courts have always
been concerned about reliability, cross-examination protects the truth seeking
process. In fact, Professor Wigmore called cross-examination "the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. 228 Moreover, the social cost is
also small, since we are not talking about letting a guilty man go free; rather, we
are talking about how much prison time a convict should get.
To be sure, this rule will require the government to call in witnesses whose
testimony could otherwise be offered through a probation officer or case agent.
And, there may be policy reasons why the government would prefer not to have to
call these witnesses. For example, confidential informants do not want to have their
identities disclosed. Also, victims may desire not to have to face their wrongdoers
again. Even citizen witnesses may prefer not to be dragged into a judicial
proceeding. In exchange for the risk they face for testifying, confidential
informants often benefit from their testimony, and United States Attorney's offices
typically have victim witness coordinators whose job is to help victims through the
judicial process. While this rule will make the government work harder to ensure it
has witnesses prepared for sentencing, this burden is no different than what it
routinely deals with throughout the prosecution process. In reality, this burden is
slight compared to the benefit that cross-examination will bring to the criminal
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2), (3)(B).
226. 414 F.3d 174, 176 (1st Cir. 2005).
227. 413 F.3d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 2005).
228. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 1.
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justice system. One scholar sums it up like this:
Still, in many cases, applying Crawford's confrontation principles at
capital sentencing need not limit the information available to a sentencer.
Where a hearsay declarant is available to testify, Crawford merely requires
the government to present that information in a different, albeit less
convenient, form: through the live testimony of the witness with direct
knowledge of the facts. And when the witness testifies, the Confrontation
Clause becomes a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, guaranteeing the
right to develop further information on cross-examination. Thus, the result
of confrontation at capital sentencing may be more, not less, information.
The cost may be no more than time and inconvenience. The benefit is
preserving a defendant's right to test government evidence.2
VI. CONCLUSION
In short, the Confrontation Clause "is worth the cost." As Eighth Circuit Chief
Judge Arnold observed, "[i]t is, after all, not a 'technicality' serving some
extraneous purpose .... It bears directly on and significantly advances the truth-
seeking function of sentencing hearings.",230 Requiring the government to prove
disputed facts with live witnesses ensures that courts can carefully scrutinize the
basis for the sentence they will impose. The consequences of aggravating facts at
sentencing-even after Booker's remedy of making the Guidelines advisory-are
very severe for defendants. Rather than mechanically applying old cases, courts
should carefully consider the various reasons why their precedents were misguided.
Most notably, this will be because of their failure to engage the Sixth Amendment
and their error as to the import of the SRA. Courts should now recognize that the
text of the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation at all stages of prosecution,
including sentencing, and that Booker's remedy has not resolved the procedural
concerns that require application of the Confrontation Clause under the SRA. For
these reasons, courts should conclude that Crawford does apply at sentencing and
give defendants at sentencing the protections described therein.
229. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1967, 2027 (2005).
230. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 412 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, J., dissenting).

